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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SCOTT D. CAMPBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 48107-2020
Blaine Co. Case No.
CR07-19-3501

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Campbell failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing discretion?

Campbell Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In October of 2019, the state charged Campbell with one count of felony DUI, alleging
that he had committed two DUIs within the prior ten years. (R., pp.55-56.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement with the state, Campbell pleaded guilty as charged. (R., pp.69-78; Tr., p.21, L.20 –
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p.23, L.12.) The district court sentenced Campbell to five years, with three years fixed, and
placed him on probation. (R., pp.139-40.) Campbell timely appealed. (R., pp.131-33.)
Campbell argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.) Review of the record and application of the
relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
Where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a
clear abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8,
368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “‘In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of
discretion by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324
(1982)).
Campbell fails to meet his burden to show the district court abused its discretion by
sentencing him to five years with three years fixed. On appeal he argues that, in “light of the

2

mitigating factors that exist in this case … the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive underlying sentence.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

Campbell cites his history of

“alcoholism and the desire to remain sober, coupled with” his “remorse for [his] actions,” which
he purports “are mitigating factors that should counsel a court to impose a less severe sentence.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)
This argument fails because the district court was well aware of Campbell’s remorseful
statements, and history of alcoholism, which it considered along with all the other aggravating
and mitigating circumstances statements at sentencing. (See
- - Tr., p.36, L.8 – p.44, L.11.) As for
Campbell’s addiction history, those facts were far more aggravating than mitigating. The district
court noted that, a month prior to sentencing, Campbell had told the presentence investigator “the
reason for coming to Kimi Recovery Center was because ‘I need to get this done, I don’t need
treatment.’” (PSI, p.17 (boldface omitted).) Campbell made these comments despite having
previously “completed a 90-day inpatient program with Narconon in 2013,” and despite accruing
three DUIs in less than ten years. (PSI, pp.6-7, 12.) As such, the district court correctly found
that Campbell had little insight into the depths of his problems with alcohol, and rightly viewed
Campbell’s pronouncements that he had “remained sober with the help of the things—skills I
learned at Narconon” (Tr., p.36, L.25 – p.37, L.1), with skepticism:
But then something that is germane to the sentencing, you state you don’t
need treatment. You told the GAIN—in the GAIN report you said, “I need to get
this done. I don’t need treatment.” That was a quote in the GAIN report. And
you would like to avoid the treatment because you feel you’ve learned enough
from the inpatient program that you were in in Louisiana in 2013….
But the point still remains that you had the tools that you claim you have
right now, therefore, you don't need any further treatment. But, of course, you
had those very same tools before you got behind the vehicle [sic] on October 2,
2019.
(Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.12.)
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These conclusions were supported by the GAIN report, which likewise found Campbell
“demonstrate[d] minimal awareness of” his substance abuse “problem and the need to change,”
as follows:
Scott has been unable to control his alcohol use with an attendant probability of
harming himself or others as evidenced by his report of Scott reported being
arrested for his 3rd DUI on 10/02/2019. Scott needs an understanding of the skills
to change current substance use patterns such as to prevent high-risk situations
and stabilize him to avoid relapse. Scott lacks the skills needed to prevent
continued use. Scott has a high likelihood of relapse without the close monitoring
and support of Level 1.0 Outpatient Program.
(PSI, p.23.)
In light of Campbell’s substance abuse issues, his own lack of insight into them, and the
continuing risks they posed to himself and the community, the five-year sentence here was
justified.
And while Campbell certainly made some remorseful statements during his presentence
interview and the sentencing hearing (see,
e.g.,
-- - Tr., p.36, L.20 – p.37, L.20), the district court
was still required to weigh that mitigating evidence against the facts of this case. The court
correctly found those facts showed Campbell still posed a great risk to society:
So I went through this and I always try to look at aggravating and mitigating
factors and, Mr. Campbell, you were a danger to society. You got behind the
wheel of a vehicle at .246. I don’t know how much you had to drink to get to that
level, but it is a significant amount and it would indicate to me that you have a
problem with alcohol. And it’s not just a problem with one—I don’t think a
person could get to that level without being—having an addiction or a drinking
problem. And your judgment is clearly impaired when you’re at that level.
You were a danger to citizens when you drove that vehicle. And this would be a
far different sentencing if you had swerved into the southbound lane—I’m sorry,
into the northbound lane of Highway 75 and struck someone. And this is
dangerous. This is unacceptable. You should know better.
(Tr., p.43, L.15 – p.44, L.5.)
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In light of the facts of this case, Campbell’s prior history, and all the other mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the court rightly concluded a five-year sentence was necessary to
“protect society” and help Campbell address his issues. (Tr., p.44, Ls.6-17.) That sentence was
well within the bounds of the court’s discretion. Campbell fails to show otherwise.
Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Campbell’s sentence.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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